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CHAPTER 15 
Public Utilities 
HERBERT BAER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§15.1. Water companies: Rates. Salisbury Water Co. v. Depart-
ment of Public Utilities1 was an appeal by a water company from a 
decision of the department disallowing a portion of a rate increase 
sought by the water company, in which the appellant challenged the 
validity of the department's finding of a fair rate of return. 
In utility rate regulation, "rate of return" has come to mean that 
percentage of capital invested which the utility should be permitted 
to earn in excess of its operating expenses, taxes and depreciation. It 
is the amount of revenues, calculated as a percentage of investment, that 
should be available to investors, both lenders and equity holders. The 
test of "fairness" suggests a standard that is highly subjective in nature. 
Under previous decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, however, 
fairness has been held to require that a utility be allowed a return 
which is sufficient to "maintain financial integrity, attract capital, and 
compensate investors for the risks assumed." 2 It has become the 
practice in rate cases that the utilities present, as part of their case, 
the testimony of a financial expert who renders an opinion as to the 
minimum rate of return which would meet the standard of the New 
England Telephone case. 
In the Salisbury case the company offered such an opinion of an 
expert based principally on the so-called "cost of capital," that is, the 
conclusion of the witness as to what return would be required by in-
vestors on the various types of securities of the company, if the com-
pany were to issue securities of that type. The opinion was supported 
by various objective market data. It is apparent, however, that the 
degree of objectivity of such evidence varies from case to case owing 
to a number of factors. Among the more important are the extent 
of the market for the company's securities, the number of comparable 
companies existing, the availability of data relating to such companies, 
the general state of the market and the assumptions that must be made 
HERBERT BAER is Counsel of the Department of Public Utilities and a member 
of the firm of Maloney, Williams, Baer & Doukas, Boston. 
§15.l. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1233, 184 N.E.2d 44, also noted in §12.5 supra. 
:.I New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 
11111 Mass. 604, 617,121 N.E.2d 896, 903 (1954). 
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concerning the amount of new securities, the proportions of the vari-
ous types and the period over which they will be issued. 
In the Salisbury case, the company was a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
and no market data was available with respect to its common stock. 
Moreover, because of its small size little data as to comparable com-
panies was available. The department presented no evidence, but in 
its decision disallowed the rate of return found necessary by the ex-
pert. Noting the basic subjective nature of his opinion, the depart-
ment held that it could substitute its own judgment and its expertise 
as an administrative agency engaged in regulation for that of the 
witness. 
Reliance on expertise is permitted by the Administrative Procedure 
Act in evaluating evidence presented.s The Supreme Judicial Court 
held, however, that even if the department were justified, on the basis 
of its expertise, in rejecting the testimony, the record would be devoid 
of evidence to support its own findings H(N]on acceptance of testi-
mony does not create substantial evidence to the contrary." 4 
The Court appears to agree that the department is not bound by 
the testimony of the company's expert. It would seem that if the 
department could reject that testimony as unpersuasive, and did so 
reject it, it would follow that the company failed to sustain its burden 
of proof. Doubtless, the Court was persuaded that such a result 
would leave the company in the untenable position of having to wait 
until the record is dosed to discover the basis of the department's 
decision and having no opportunity to present evidence on the matter 
deemed material by the department. Moreover, the company would 
be deprived of an opportunity to test the department's decision on 
appeal, if the department had the power to reject totally the testimony 
offered by the company. The effect of the Court's decision therefore 
appears to be that the department may not reject expert testimony 
when there is no contrary evidence in the record. 
§15.2. Electric companies: Service. Electric companies desiring to 
construct transmission lines may, with the approval of the Department 
of Public Utilities, given after hearing and findings as set forth in 
G.L., c. 164, §72, take land by eminent domain. That section provides 
that a company may petition for authority to construct a transmission 
line. The department, after hearing, may determine that the line 
"is necessary for the purpose alleged, and will serve the public con-
venience and is consistent with the public interest." If the company 
files a map of the transmission line, the department may, after notice 
and hearing, authorize the company to take land necessary for the 
line by eminent domain. 
In Town of Sudbury v. Department of Public Utilities,1 Boston 
Edison Company had been given authority after hearing to construct 
S G.L., c. 30A, §1l(5). 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1233, 1238, 184 N.E.2d 44, 47. 
§15.2. 1343 Mass. 428, 179 N.E.2d 263 (1962). 
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a transmission line through the town of Sudbury. It was contended 
by the appellants that the decision of the department was not a final 
decision, since no hearing had been held and no decision had been 
made regarding the authority to take by eminent domain. 
Most companies have for many years followed the procedure of first 
filing a petition for authority to construct a transmission line without 
asking for permission to take by eminent domain. This petition is 
heard separately and if the department makes the necessary findings 
and authorizes construction, the company then sets out to acquire by 
purchase the necessary land. A subsequent petition for authority to 
take by eminent domain may be filed and heard separately, if the 
company finds itself unable to acquire sufficient land by purchase. 
A final hearing may be necessary, if, having acquired all the private 
lands necessary, the company is denied authority by a municipality 
to cross public ways. The Supreme Judicial Court held not only that 
the statute permits this procedure, but also that each separate deter-
mination of the department is a final and appealable order. 
The troublesome part of the decision is the statement that in each 
determination "all relevant questions of public convenience and neces· 
sity must be considered." 2 It would appear that the issues of public 
convenience and necessity differ very slightly, if at all, in the different 
stages of the proceeding. The decision seems to invite a repetition 
of evidence before the department and to permit repeated appeals to 
the Court upon the same issue. The possibility may be more theo-
retical than real, however, since the expense of litigation will act as 
a deterrent to repeated opposition when the tribunal has already dealt 
with the issues. 
In any case, there is no doubt that the companies have the power 
to telescope the hearings and avoid repetition by combining a petition 
for authority with a petition to take by eminent domain. The present 
procedure is advantageous to the companies in that the exact route 
is not fixed from the outset. Thus they may be able to take advantage 
of favorable acquisitions by varying the route slightly. If the point 
is reached at which the cost of multiple hearings outweighs the pos-
sible savings in land acquisition costs, we may find the companies 
combining the separate procedures. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§15.3. Electric utilities: Rates. In Fall River Electric Light Co.,! 
the Department of Public Utilities, as in the Salisbury Water case,2 
disagreed with the conclusions of the company's expert witness on fair 
2 MS Mass. at 4SS, 179 N.E.2d at 267. 
§15.S. 1 D.P.U. lS6S5 (April, 1962). 
2 Salisbury Water Supply Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 1962 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 123S, 184 N.E.2d 44, noted in §15.l supra. 
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rate of return. In this case, however, rather than reject the evidence 
completely, the department based its finding upon the data intro-
duced by the expert. In arriving at his conclusion the witness had 
relied upon returns on equity and interest coverages of companies that 
he determined to be comparable. The return found by the depart-
ment to be adequate to permit the company to meet its obligations 
and attract sufficient capital, while below the average of these "com-
parable" companies, was equal to or above many included on the list. 
There is some question as to whether this approach is consistent 
with the rationale of the Salisbury case. The admissibility of expert 
evidence rests in part at least on the assumption that the expert has 
special competence in drawing conclusions from market data. If the 
ability to draw conclusions from such data rests on expert knowledge 
and skill, and if the Salisbury case holds that the department may not 
substitute its expertise for evidence, then it may be argued that the 
department may not, on the basis of the same data, draw conclusions 
which conflict with that arrived at by the expert. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that the department is compe-
tent to choose between the conflicting testimony of two experts al-
though the underlying data may be the same. This certainly implies a 
competency to evaluate the data on which the various opinions are 
based. It would seem to follow that the same ability to evaluate data 
when two experts have testified exists when only one has been heard. 
If in the one case the department can find that the data supports one 
conclusion or another, the department ought to be accorded the same 
power in the other. 
§15.4. Commercial motor vehicles: Rates. In Re A. R. Sandri,1 
the District Director of Internal Revenue purported to seize and sell 
a certificate which had been issued by the Department of Public Utili-
ties to an irregular route common carrier. The vendee sought ap-
proval by the department of the transfer of the certificate under the 
provisions of G.L., c. 15gB, §ll. This statute permits transfer of a 
certificate if the transferee proves at a public hearing that he is fit, 
willing and able, but no transfer is permitted except in connection 
with a bona fide sale of the business of the transferor, who may not 
thereafter hold a certificate for one year. 
The department refused to entertain the application because it had 
not been signed by the transferor, some of whose rights would be 
adjudicated in a transfer proceeding. Moreover, the "property" which 
was purportedly sold was not property subject to being reached by 
creditors generally but is a privilege which is transferable only when 
permitted by statute. The statute deals explicitly with various credi-
tor situations, such as bankruptcy, in which creditors are given rights 
with respect to a certificate which would be superfluous if the certificate 
could be seized by creditors under the ordinary creditor remedies. 
§15.4. 1 D.P.U. 15800 (Feb. 1962). 
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The proposed transferee could not therefore gain any rights through 
the District Director of Internal Revenue in the absence of any provi-
sion permitting seizure for a tax delinquency. 
§15.5. Passenger transportation agencies: Rates. The operating 
ratio of a bus company is the ratio of its operating expenses to its 
operating revenues. The expected operating ratio is the usual test of 
the reasonableness of any proposed rate increase. This test is used 
rather than the rate of return on investment, because of the low ratio 
of investment to operating revenues typical of the bus industry. Ex-
tremely small variations in operating revenues or expenses would 
produce very large percentage changes in a rate of return based on 
investment. 
The operating ratio method allows a reasonable percentage of reve-
nues, above all operating expenses, for payment of interest and return 
on equity invested in the business. Elmer R. LaValley, d.b.a. Spring-
field-Agawam Airport Lines,l however, illustrates that the minimum 
operating ratio appropriate for a corporation is not a sound test for 
a sole proprietorship. In the latter case, the operating expenses do not 
include any payments for services performed by the proprietor. The 
department recognized that part of net income expected was in the 
nature of wages for the substantial services performed by the pro-
prietor. To do otherwise would place the proprietor in a worse posi-
tion than if he had hired an outsider to perform his work. An oper· 
ating ratio of 80 percent, which is considerably lower than would 
normally be permitted to a corporation, was therefore allowed. 
§15.6. Water companies: Rates. In Dedham Water Co.,l the de-
partment closed out the question of rate differentials existing between 
the towns of Westwood and Dedham in the rate schedules of the com-
pany. In an earlier case the department had approved a tariff which 
contained a differential based on a cost study and reflecting the addi-
tional cost of booster pumps to serve certain customers. This differ-
ential replaced one which had been based largely on historical factors. 
In its approval the department noted that because the formulation 
of a rate structure was not an exact science, its practice had been to 
control the general level of rates and to leave allocation among cus-
tomers to management judgment unless plainly wrong. At the same 
time, the department ordered a study of the effect of a complete elimi-
nation of the differential. The study showed that the monetary effect 
of the elimination of the differential would be negligible. Moreover, 
although the differential was based on cost allocation studies, because 
of the geographical location of the booster pumps some customers 
were being served from these pumps and charged the higher rate, al-
though their location did not really require additional pumping. 
§15.5. 1 D.P.U. 15674 (Oct. 1961). 
§15.6. 1 D.P.U. l!1271-C aune. 1962). See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.5 for 
a disculSion of the earlier decision. 
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Because no reason for the differential appeared to remain, the depart-
ment ordered its elimination. 
Wannacomet Water CO.2 was the occasion for another departure 
from the department's general practice respecting rate structures. The 
proposed rate provided for a fixed service charge based on the size of 
the meter connection plus a commodity charge based on the amount 
of water consumed. This type of rate is prohibited for gas and elec-
tric companies,3 but the company contended that it was an equitable 
method of distributing the standby cost of facilities equitably between 
seasonal and annual customers. The department found that fair ap-
portionment could be effected by a minimum charge which would in-
clude an amount of water which could be consumed, and refused to 
allow the service charge type of rate. 
In the same case, the company was ordered to increase its deprecia-
tion reserve and make an offsetting debit to surplus on account of in-
adequate past depreciation charges. The basis for the finding was the 
cost study made by the company for the purpose of allocating the book 
depreciation reserve to the various classes of customers. The ratio of 
the average age of each class of property to the estimated useful life 
of each class multiplied by the original cost of each class resulted in 
an amount which was $76,000 more than the book reserve for depreci-
ation. 
The company contended that this was not a sound test of a proper 
depreciation reserve because it does not take account of the fact that the 
use of composite depreciation rates may result in times when, because 
of retirements of property having shorter than average lives, an ap-
parent deficiency is created in the reserve. Moreover, it was argued 
that the addition to the reserve, and the consequent diminution of the 
rate base, was 'unfair because of the retroactiveness of the burden placed 
on the company, although in earlier years it may not have been appar-
ent that the annual charges were inadequate. 
The department conceded that other methods of calculating the 
reserve might be proper, but found that the method contained in the 
company's study was adequate. Although viewed from the company's 
position, the action of the department has its retroactive aspects, from 
the customers' side it is wholly prospective. It is unfair that present 
and future customers should pay a return on plant which is not avail-
able to serve them. The reduction in rate base does not reverse past 
experience of the company, but is a method of valuing, for the present, 
the plant devoted to the utility business. 
§15.7. Passenger transportation agencies: Service. The New York, 
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, one of two railroads 
now operating service to Worcester, sought to relocate its passenger 
station in the city from Union Station to its freight house in the city, 
offering as its reason the substantial savings that could be accom-
plished if it were relieved of its share of the expenses of operating 
2 D.P.U. l!I525 Gune, 1962). 
3 G.L., c. 164, §1l9. 
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Union Station, which is owned by the New York Central Railroad 
Company. 
Section 2 of Chapter 422 of the Acts of 1905 provides: 
Said station shall be used by all the railroads now entering the 
City of Worcester, the railroad corporations owning or operating 
such railroads severally yielding and paying to the Boston and 
Albany Railroad Company, its lessees, successors or assigns, a rea-
sonable rent for the use thereof, which, if not agreed upon by 
the parties, shall be determined, and may be revised and altered 
from time to time at intervals of not less than three years, by the 
board of railroad commissioners upon a petition presented to said 
board by either of said corporations. 
Since there was no assurance under this statute that the New Haven 
would be relieved of its share of the expense of operating Union sta-
tion, the expenses of relocation were not warranted, and the Depart-
ment of Public Utilities refused its approval.1 
C. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
§15.8. Commercial motor vehicles. Most utilities, almost since the 
inception of regulation by the Department of Public Utilities, have 
been required to file annual financial statements with the department.1 
No such requirement existed for commercial motor vehicles, largely 
because it was felt that the financial burden of keeping records would 
be too great for some of the smaller carriers. Requirements for record 
keeping have been increasingly imposed by other governmental agen-
cies, e.g., the Internal Revenue Service and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. Only slight additional cost would be required of the 
great majority of carriers to file statements with the department. 
Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult for the department to 
handle rate matters, especially applications for general increases in 
minimum rates, with inadequate financial data. Effective January I, 
1963, most common carriers will be required to file two-page state-
ments which will summarize the financial operating results, disclose 
the type of business entity of the carriers and some of the essential 
facts about the type of operation conducted.2 
D. LEGISLATION 
§15.9. Water companies. Chapter 154 of the Acts of 1962 extended 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Utilities to all companies 
engaged in the distribution and sale of water through mains. For-
merly a water company was not subject to regulation unless its mains 
§15.7. 1 D.P.U. Hl5!! (Oct. 1961). 
§15.8. 1 E.g., G.L., c. 164, §8!: c. 159. §!2. 
2 D.P.U. Hl77! (Feb. 1962). 
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occupied public streets. The companies affected by this amendment 
are largely those with a handful of customers in small housing de-
velopments where the streets have not been accepted., .Frequently they 
are cooperatively owned by the customers. For many, the requirement 
of filing of annual returns, maintaining proper rate filings, and pos-
sibly engaging in rate cases will be onerous. There may be instances, 
however, in which individual developers have maintained control of 
the water supply in the development, and the new statute will afford 
the customers redress against arbitrary action by the developer. 
8
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